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111. B E R G M A N N O N P E R C E I V I N G , S E N S I N G ,
AND APPEARING
DAN C R A W F O R D
cut through a great deal of terminology and coarse
style to behold the theory in its essentials.
A second reason for the lack of widespread dishowever, only with "later Bergmann," that is, cussion of Bergmann's thought is that Bergmann
with the perceptual theory worked out in a series of himself has tended to be out of sympathy with the
essays in which Bergmann shifts from phenome- prevailing methods and problem-areas of recent
nalism to a form of intentional realism. This label discussion in the philosophy of mind. One of my
("intentional realism") indicates the two dominant goals is to show that Bergmann is not as far rethemes in Bergmann's later thought about percep- moved from the main currents of recent discussion
tion: perceivings are analyzed as mental acts as one might think. Through patient exposition
(thoughts) which are intentionally related to real and careful criticism, I shall try to show where
and mind-independent objects and states of affairs. there is common ground between Bergmann and
In a timely essay, " Intentionality" ( 1 9 5 5 ) ~ ~other strands in the philosophy of perception, and
Bergmann presented an impressive defense of men- also where I believe Bergmann has made valuable
tal acts, and although the framework of that essay contributions to the current debate.
I shall begin with a sketch of Bergmann's conwas still phenomenalistic, the structural analysis of
mental acts and their intentionality presented there cept of veridical perception. This first section will be
has not been significantly altered by Bergmann in largely expository and foundational, setting the
later writings. In two subsequent essays, "Acts" stage for later discussion. Its initial aim is to
(1960) and "Realistic Postscript" (1963) his acquaint the reader with "the act" and its mental
realistic turn was worked out in detail in the con- properties, but it also includes a short discussion of
text of giving a satisfactory account of ordinary Bergmann's conception of the objects of perceptual
perceptual experience. These three essays will acts. In the following sections, I shall present
Bergmann's views on perceptual error and appearing,
comprise the core texts of the study that follows.2
Bergmann's perceptual theory has not received and on sensations, and work from them toward what
its fair share of attention from the majority of con- I believe to be a more adequate understanding of
temporary analytic philosophers of perception. I these concepts.
can think of two reasons whv this is so. First. there is
the problem of the approachability of Bergmann's
: ( I ) THEMENTAL
ACT
VERIDICAL
PERCEPTION
theory. His two most important essays on perception, "Acts" and "Realistic Postscript," are rather
The fundamental idea underlying Bergmann's
obscurely situated in a collection of essays which account of veridical perceptions is that they should
contains a formidable line-up of ontological and be viewed as a species of mental act (thought)
historical topics. And once the perceptual theory intending nonmental and actual states of affairs,
has been located within the texts, there is then the also called "facts." Thoughts, i.e., individual
more difficult problem of isolating it from the thinkings, are construed as (bare) particulars
ontological system in which it is firmly embedded. exemplifying two "simple " mental properties : a
An added handicap is that in doing this one must propositional attitude (Int, 7, 28; Acts, 36)3 and

N this study I am going to present and discuss
Imann's
some of the central themes of Gustav Bergtheory of perception. I shall be concerned,

1 Gustav Bergmann, "Intentionality" in Meaning and Existence (Madison, 1960),pp. 3-38; "Acts" and "Realistic Postcript"
occur in Logic and Reality (Madison, 1964),pp. 3-44 and 302-340 respectively. Hereafter, references to these three essays will be
included in the body of the text in the following abbreviated fashion: (Int, 3), (Acts, 4), (RP, 302).
a The general theory of acts, couched in a frame of intentional realism, worked out in these essays, is also maintained in
Bergmann's more recent book, Realism (Madison, 1967).
8 Bergmann refers to the "species" of an act, or to its "mode of awareness," rather than its "propositional attitude."
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what Bergmann refers to as a ccpropositional
character" (Int, 28). In holding that mental acts
exhibit these two nonrelational properties, Bergmann is rejecting G. E. Moore's claim that mental
acts are diaphanous.
When Bergmann says that mental acts have
propositional characters, he is committing himself
to the idea that propositions or judgments enter
into perceptions. He refers to these unique propositional properties of acts by means of a quoting
device which forms new predicates out of sentences :
thus he would speak of a "this-is-green" mental
act.4 Since the intentionality of thoughts is not one
of the topics of this essay, I shall have very little to
say about these unique intentional properties. I
shall simply assume that individual thoughtepisodes do have a propositional property, and I
shall refer to this property by means of Bergmann's
special predicates (e.g., "this-is-green")
Now let us turn to the other simple property of
acts, the propositional attitude. Bergmann holds
that a thought always has the property of being,
e.g., a perceiving, a believing, a thinking of, a
doubting whether, a sensing, e t ~ I.t ~should be
noted that in the case of perceiving, Bergmann
allows that the mental property in question may be
the specific types of perceiving: visual, tactile, etc.
(Acts, 36). He thinks it is necessary to introduce
these mental properties to account for certain
introspectible differences among mental acts which
have the same propositional character. Now I do
believe that Bergmann is on good ground in making
such a claim, at least in regard to perception. For I
do not see how it can be denied that there are
noticeable differences, which anyone can detect
and report about, between the mental experiences
as experiences of perceiving that something is green
and merely thinking that it is green. I shall take it
that Bergmann's mental property, being aperceiving,
refers to this introspectible perceptual character of the
former kind of experience. However, I shall later
call into question the idea that this perceptual
character of some mental states is "simple," if this
means that it cannot be defined in terms of other
mental concepts.
Now if, as Bergmann says, being a perceiving
describes a nonrelational property of a mental act,

.

then it dawns immediately that his conception of
perceiving (and hence of seeing) differs radically
from that of most contemporary philosophers. For
it is generally accepted that the ordinary concept of
seeing is one which describes a knowledge-relation
between an observer and an actual object: seeingthat is taken to be a specific kind of knowing-that.
Bergmann, however, uses "see" in such a way that
I.

S sees that this is green

does not imply that this is green. The concept of
seeing pertains solely to a mental act, and does not
carry any implication about the truth of the proposition involved in that act, nor about the grounds
or justification for accepting that proposition.
Now Bergmann might argue, in defense of this
usage, that there is some basis in common speech
for construing the notion of seeing in the way that
he does, and not as a type of knowing. I t is natural
for someone to say, for example, that he had seen a
ghost, or an unidentified flying object, even when
he has good grounds for believing, or even knows,
that what was seen in these cases did not exist.
However, granting that these are correct uses of
"see," it is still questionable whether the perceptual
verb in these contexts is being used to describe a
property of a mental state as Bergmann suggests.
For it should be noted that in the above contexts, it
would be equally appropriate for the subject to report what he seemed to see, or what appeared to him
("There appeared to be a ghost there"). But I
shall later interpret Bergmann as saying that these
seems-statements and appears-statements do not
function solely to describe a mental property of a
mental state, but also to call into question the truth
or falsity of that mental state. Consequently, it
seems that Bergmann's use of "see" and "perceive" to refer to an introspectible feature of a
mental state is a technical use of these expressions
without any clear basis in common speech. Of
course there is nothing wrong with using ordinary
terms in special ways, as long as, when one is done,
things hang together in the way they are supposed
to.
One interesting consequence of Bergmann's use
of "see" is that it becomes correct to say that cases
of both veridical and nonveridical perception are

4 I have added hyphens to Bergmann's single quotes to make these unique predicates more conspicuous to the reader. These
predicates may be viewed as technical expressions whose ordinary language equivalents are the that-clauses which occur in such
ordinary contexts as: "George's thinking that this is green occurred at t."
6 I take it that the same mental act may instantiate more than one attitude, although Bergmam does not, to my knowledge, deal
with this question. It seems we must allow that the very same act which is a perceiving that this is a chair may also be a believing that this is a chair, which for Bergmann is a distinct kind of act.
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cases of seeing. For since the mental states, considered as mental states, that occur in veridical
perception could well be identical in kind with
those that occur in nonveridical perception (if the
subject is deceived), then both would exhibit the
property of being a seeing in Bergmann's sense.
Now I pointed out above that I believe it is necessary to speak of some mental acts as having a
perceptual character in order to distinguish them from
other nonperceptual acts. And certainly the acts
involved in appearings exhibit this same perceptual
quality. However, I shall argue that there is a
profounder reason for grouping appearings and
veridical seeings under the common head of perceiving~as Bergmann does. In doing so, I shall
defend the view, which differs from Bergmann's,
that the concept of a perceiving as a knowing is the
basic concept in our ordinary beliefs about perception, and that the concept of an appearing presupposes it.
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seen is a fact about some area-particular. One might
achieve this state by focusing more narrowly on the
facing surface of the table. The propositional
character of such an induced minimal perceiving
would be expressed by a sentence of the form
This area-particular has such-and-such properties.

However, it should be apparent that Bergmann
in the above passage is making a much stronger
claim than this phenomenological one. He is in fact
maintaining that the intentional objects of perceiving~,can be analyzed in terms of a set of particulars having observable properties. He goes on to
say that what has been said about perceivings,
"provides a cue for assaying the intentions of perceiving~,," and then proceeds to analyze ordinary
objects (or rather facts pertaining to them) as
follows. (Here I must include a rather lengthy and
tortured passage, as it introduces ter&nblogy
without which the reader will be lost in later
discussion.)
Let 'Mp' be the sentence representing the fact that
would have been presented to me if the act had been a
Bergmann's account of the objects of ordinary
perceiving, instead of a perceiving,. Let 'a,,. .., a,'
perceptions turns on a key distinction between two
stand for the particulars "in" it and, whenever it
types of perceiving ( I and 2) that differ in respect
helps, write 'Mp(al, . . .,a,) ' instead of 'Mp'. The
letter 'My in 'Mp' is to remind us that the fact is
of their intentional objects. The intended objects of
molecular. The letter 'p' is to recall 'part'. For I assay
perceivings,, Bergmann says, are such "ordinary
P
(This is a table), which is the intention of the perthings" as chairs and tables. Hence the proposiceiving, with which we are concerned, as a conjunction
tional characters of these perceptual acts are about
of two (part) facts. One is Mp; the other I call Op.
ordinary things, e.g., " this-is-a-table." A perceivThat makes 'P' an abbreviation for 'Mp. Op'. The
ing,, on the other hand, intends (in the case of
letter ' 0' is to remind us that ' Op' contains operators.
vision) an area-particular (RP, 319) rather than a
Op, the operator part of P, is very complex indeed.
whole object. Bergmann introduces the notion of
Fortunately we need no details. The idea is easily
a perceiving, and its object by making a phenograsped. 'Op' schematically states that there are all
menological point about perceivings, :
the particulars which must be there, that these particulars have all the properties they must have, and that
When I perceive, the table, my "attention does not
they stand in all the relations in which they must
center" on any of the particulars "in" it that may or
stand, among themselves and to the particulars in the
may not on this occasion be presented to me.
molecular part, if the latter is to be "in" a table.
He continues :
(RP, 314-315.)
I n this passage, Bergmann is putting forward the
But we all are, when perceiving2,capable of shifting to
another act whose intention is the fact of some parti- improbable idea that the area-particular(s) which I
cular (or particulars) exemplifying some properties would perceive, if I were perceiving, (Mp), is the
(and relations). These particulars are all "in" the core ingredient of what I do perceive when I pertable; . . The species of [this act] is again perceiving. ceive, the whole table. This claim carries with it the
Yet [its intention] is characteristically "narrower" idea that the only particulars which are "present"
than that of the preceding perceiving,. An act with to me when I perceive a table are those which consuch an intention I call a perceiving,. (RP, 314.)
stitute its facing surface.
Here I take Bergrnann to be saying, correctly,
Now I believe that Bergmann gets on the wrong
that while observing a table, we are capable of track in attempting to analyze the ordinary objects
shifting to another perceptual act in which what is of perceivings, in terms of the objects of the

.. .

.
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corresponding perceivings,. For it seems to me a
mistake (although I shall not try to prove that it is)
to think that the area-particulars seen in perceivings, are in any sense parts or constituents of ordinary
objects. The area-particulars which Bergmann
thinks are seen in normal perceptions are actually
very special objects seen in very special circumstances (usually experimental situations). Hence
Bergmann's error does not lie in thinking that
area-particulars can be perceptual objects, but in
taking them as the "cue" to the perception of
ordinary objects.
In the remainder of this essay, I shall be concerned primarily with instances of perceiving,,
where the intentional objects are ordinary things. I
shall argue that the notion of a perceiving, is a useful one only because of the role it plays in helping us
to understand the concept of a sensation.

error] there is only one hurdle to overcome. One
must recognize that possibilities exist'' (RP, 321).
Let us look at how Bergmann explains this point
about qualitative appearing in a particular case.
We should note that his entire discussion of error
turns on the preceding analysis of perceivings,.
The example given is the following:
I perceive, an oval coin. Surprised that there should
be such a thing, I reach for it, examine it, perceivea6it
to be round. The ' Op' of the original perceiving, is
false. How about its 'Mp'? Let a be the particular
(area) "in" it that was presented to me. 'a is round',
I have now reason to believe, is true; 'a is oval', false.
The latter is a conjuction term of 'Mp'. That makes
MP, too, a mere possibility. But the externalparticular in
Mp is real. (RP, 3 I 9.)
Though we have already been introduced to the
terminology in this
it is nevertheless so
compressed that a commentary is necessary. I offer
the following construction of what is being said.
In this example, the perceptual judgment involved in the original perceiving, is expressed by
the false sentence "this is an oval coin." In making
this judgment, the perceiver is intending something
about all the particulars in the coin, including of
course the area-particular in the facing surface.
Now in the above passage, Bergmann suggests that
the perceiver, when judging, that this is an oval
coin, is at the same time making a secondjudgment,
which corresponds to Mp in the object, namely the
judgment
that a is oval. Hence he seems to be
assuming, tacitly, that when one judges that something is an oval coin, he is committed to the further
judgment that the particular in the facing surface
of the coin is oval.'
On this interpretation, Bergmann's point comes
to this: since both of the judgments involved in this
perceptual experience are false, then their intentional objects are merely possible states of affairs.
However, the individual thing which these possible
states of affairs concern is actual. The coin is real!8
Clearly the crux of Bergmann's analysis of perceptual error lies in his ontological claim about

For Bergmann, there are two kinds of perceptual
error: qualitatiue and existential. In the former, some
actual thing appears to be other than it is, whereas
in the latter, there appears to be something which
does not actually exist, as in hallucinations. I shall
limit my discussion to Bergmann's concept of qualitative appearing.
We have seen that cases of perceptual error are
to be construed as perceiuings in Bergmann's sense,
and that they could involve the same propositions
as veridical perceivings. The difference between
veridical and nonveridical mental acts is that the
proposition involved in the former is true, and in the
latter false.
Bergmann's main concern is with the ontological implications of this epistemic difference. He
claims that in cases of error where we are not
related to an actual state of affairs, we are nevertheless still related to something, namely a nonactual state of affairs, or as he puts it, somewhat
paradoxically, a "possible fact." The essential
point is put this way: "In assaying [qualitative

6 This is not a typographical error. A perceiving, for Bergmann is the final perception2in a series of perceivings2aimed at
checking the truth of the first perceivinga in that series. The judgment involved in a perceiving, is therefore a justified one.
~

-

(RP, 3;6.)
7 The situation is really more complicated than Bergmann admits. I am speaking as if MP is how I visually take the facing side
of an object to be when I see (or seem to see) that object. But this is not necessarily how I think the facing side of the object
appears. And consequently, neither is it how the area-particular which I would perceivel if I abstracted the facing surface from
the object would appear. It is really all three of these things that Bergmann is calling Mfi.
8 The account Bergmann gives of existential appearings (RP, 320-321) leads to a similar conclusion, with the important difference that the individuals which the intended possible states of affairs concern are not real. If I perceive a ghost, the nonactual
ghostly fact which is the intentional object of this perception concerns a nonactual individual ghost. If we accept the idea of
nonactual facts, then I see no reason to balk at nonactual individuals.
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possible states of affairs. Although it is not my
purpose in this essay to determine the ultimate
status of these intentional objects, I shall conclude
this section by gathering together the most important claims Bergmann makes about them, and
commenting briefly on each.
( I ) Possible states of affairs have ontological
status, though they are not actual. (2) They are
what mental acts are related to in nonveridical
perception. (3) In perceptual cases, they are rich,
sensuous states of affairs, which may be indistinguishable from the perceptible facts constituting
ordinary objects.
Bergmann is on firm ground, I believe, in making
each of these claims. I am in agreement with (I)
and (2) because it seems that if one accepts the idea
that mental acts have a propositional or judgmental character, as I do, then one is automatically
committed to the intentional objects which those
judgments are about, and to which one must make
some sort of existential reference. Bergmann reminds us that we must distinguish the act and its
object, the perceiving and the perceived. If I seem
to see a ghost at my window, that which I seem to
see, this ghost, is certainly distinct from the act or
perceptual experience which intends that object
and through which I see it. Moreover, concerning
(3), the claim that the intentional objects of perceiving~have a "sensuous" character, it is difficult to deny that the states of affairs intended by
perceptual acts, veridical and nonveridical, are
qualitatively different from those intended by nonperceptual acts such as mere thinkings.
It seems that we must accept, provisionally at
least, the conclusion that the intentional facts of
which Bergmann speaks exist in some sense, though
they are not actual.
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appears to be something which does not actually
exist. Although I shall initially work within this
framework of mere apiearings, my long-range goal
is to construct, if possible, a more general theory of
appearing which will have application also to cases
in which what appears to be the case is the case.
Before beginning this project, it will be helpful
to review in a general way what Bergmann has
said about appearing. An important feature of his
account is that he has tended to assimilate appeari n g ~and their objects to veridical perceivings and
their objects. He has done this by emphasizing that
the mental states, or more exactly acts, involved in
these two kinds of experiences could be identical,
that is, they could exhibit the same propositional
and perceptual character. In addition, he has said
that the objects of these two experiences, viz.,
states of affairs, might be the same states of affairs
in that they might be perceptually indistinguishable, and expressed by the same statement, although they differ in respect of their "mode" of
existence. In the remainder of this section I shall
explore this assimilation of nonveridical to veridical perceiving and also argue that it must be
strengthened in a way that Bergmann himself
would not allow.
The following general picture of the meaning of
appears-statements seems to emerge from Bergmann's discussion. If we say of George:
2.

There (merely) appears to George to be an
oval coin before him,

then we are asserting two things: (a) we are
describing George's occurrent visual experience as
being a perceiving that there is an oval coin before
him (where "perceiving" in this context has Bergmann's technical, nonepistemic sense in which it
describes a mental property). More exactly, we are
characterizing ~ e o k e ' sexperience as being a perceptual one, and as having a certain specific
Bergmann's primary concern, in his discussion of propositional character (" this-is-an-oval-coin ") .
perceptual error, was to arrive at an adequate 1n addition, (b) we are making an epistemic judgontology of appearing. The burden of his analysis of ment that the proposition involved in this expericases of nonveridical perception was to show that ence is false and hence that George (his act) is not
in these cases the existence of nonactual states of related to an actual state of affairs.
And if George were to make a corresponding
affairs must be admitted. In this section, I shall
move beyond Bergmann's rather circumscribed report about his own experience:
ontological concerns and ask whether or not some
3. There (merely) appears to me to be an oval
general theory or definition of the meaning of
coin over there,
appears-statements can be elicited from Bergmann's
he too would be describing the kind of experience
account.
One serious limitation of that account is that it is he was having, as well as asserting its falsity.
O n this showing, then, statements about mere
restricted to cases of perceptual error, where there
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appearings have both a descr$tive and an epistemic truth of their constituent propositions; for although
function: they describe the subject's occurrent appears-statements are often used to express doubt
experience, and also deny the truth of the proposi- about what appears, this cannot be what these
statements mean, since they can be correctly used
tional content of that experience.
I t may help to clarify this interpretation of Berg- even when the s~eakerhas no doubt whatsoever
mann if we express it in terms of the ontological about the truth of their propositions. The general
framework of mental acts. When George reports, point seems to be that if one asserts that x appearsf,
as in (3), that there merely appears to be an oval he does not thereby commit himself to either the
coin before him, Bergmann seems to be saying that truth or the falsity of the proposition that x is$
his mental state includes two distinct acts. here is.
We may now ask: is it possible to give an
first, George's perceiving (in Bergmann's sense) that account of appearing which is consistent with this
the coin is oval, and secondly, hisjudging about this point, but at the same time retains Bergmann's
perceiving that it is false, i.e., that its object is a insight that the concept of appearing is an epistemic one involving in some way the notion of truth?
possible fact.
Now I believe that this account of mere appear- The alternative would seem to be to abandon the
ings, which I am attributing to Bergmann as being link between a$pearing and truth, and hold that
very much in the spirit of his remarks, does provide there is at least one important sense of "appears"
us with all but one of the essential insights needed in which it has a purely descriptive role, i.e.,
to construct an adequate and general theory of simply describes the subject's occurrent experience.
Now I do not see that we are driven to this
appearing. First of all, Bergmann is surely right in
holding that appears-statements have the descrip- alternative, for I hold that we can, and should,
tive role he gives them. When someone reports in a explicate the concept of appearing as an epistemic
perceptual situation that something x appears to one, by means of the concept of veridical&perceiving.
have some property5 then whatever else he might The basic idea of the view I wish to defend is that
be saying, he is at least reporting his occurrent when someonejudges how something appears he is
experience. Moreover, it is correct to say that the assimilating the perceptual state he is in to a
proposition that he ascribes to his experience has corresponding state of actually perceiving. Howthe form "x isf " (rather than " x appearsf "). And ever, it is crucial to realize that the concept of perfinally, I think Bergrnann is right in linking the ceiving which I am employing is not ~ e k a n n ' s
concept of appearing with the concepts of truth and concept of perceiving (i.e., it does not name a
falsity, though as we shall see, this connection is simple mental property), nor is it even what Bergsomewhat more complicated than Bergmann mann would refer to as veridical seeing (i.e., it
recognizes. However, the fundamental mistake of does not simply describe a relation between a
this account, as I shall argue in a moment, is that it mental act and an actual object). Rather perceiving,
fails to recognize a more intimate connection that on my account, has the sense of knowing, and carries
inexists between appearing, in general, and veridical with -it the implication that the
seeing.
volved in the perceiving is not only true, but justiAt this point in the discussion, if we are to fiably accepted. In attempting to understand
achieve our goal of finding a general theory of appearings in terms of the notion of perceiving as
appearing, we must find some way of dealing with knowing, I am departing fundamentally from
the fact that not all appearings are mere appearings, Bergmann's view.
and not all appears-statements imply that their
I stated in the last paragraph that when someconstituent propositions are false. Thus someone one makes an appears-judgment he assimilates his
might say, while looking at a green wall in normal experience to that of actually perceiving. The
judgment involves, as it did for Bergmann, both a
conditions :
descriptive and an epistemic claim: (a) the subject
4. This wall appears green to me, and of course is comparing his experience, as an experience, in both
it is green.
its propositional and perceptual character, with
In this case, the proposition that the wall is green is the experience of actually perceiving the thing in
question. At the same time, (b) he is checking or
true.
Moreover, as this example shows, we cannot say cancelin.<
- the normal truth-implication of that
perceiving.
that it is at least always part of the meaning of
To apply this claim to our notorious case of the
appears-statements that they call into question the
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oval coin: when someone reports that a coin
appears oval to him, he says, in effect,
this experience of mine, as an experience, is the same
as (or closely resembles) the experience involved in
actually seeing an oval coin, though I do not (for
whatever reasons) commit myself to the idea that the
proposition involved in that experience is true (as I
would if I were actually seeing an oval coin).s
Now with regard to the epistemic part of the
meaning of appears-statements, (b) above, it
should be realized that the checking of the truthimplication of one's perceptual state does not imply
that the subject believes or even suspects that his
perception is or may be false. I t is indeed true that
very often when someone says how something
ap$ears it is because he has become aware of somk
uaavorable evidence which casts doubt on his perception. However, we have seen that it cannot be
part of the meaning of appears-statements to call
into question in this way the truth of a perception.
All that can be said, and all that needs to be said, is
that in judging how something appears, one does
not by that judgment commit himself to either the
truth or the falsity of his perception. And this is
perfectly consistent with his making another overriding judgment in that situation that the propositional content of his experience is indeed true, or
indeed false. What is important is that the appearsjudgment cancels the truth of the perception, which
automatically marks it as an essentially epistemic
judgment.1°
As to the descriptive part of the meaning of
appears-statements, (a) above, it can be seen that I
agree with Bergmann that in making these statements one is ascribing a certain propositional
character and a perceptual character to his
experience. However, I have argued that one does
not do this, as it were, directly, but indirectly by
applying to his experience the concept of a corresponding seeing which has the characteristics in
question. I would also agree with Bergmann that
appearings involve two acts rather than one inasmuch as an appearing includes a reference to a
corresponding perceiving which is, so to speak, the
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core act of the appearing, and which is qualified in
the complex way described above.
A final observation. The idea that appearings
should be analyzed in terms of veridical perceivings
finds support in the fact of ordinary usage that
sentences of the form " x looks f (to me now) " are
usually synonymous with "it is as though I were
seeing x to be$" The account of appearing I have
given secures the conceptual dependence suggested
by this usage.
What is most important is to retain the idea that
the concepts of appearing and perceiving are
essentially bound up with those of knowledge,
truth, and evidence. Bergmann is in danger of
losing sight of this fact in failing to recognize the
conceptual connections that I have stressed.

In this section I shall explore Bergmann's concept of sensations and try to determine grounds for
deciding whether or not this concept is an acceptable one. The broad questions I shall put to Bergmann are three: ( I ) what grounds are there for
thinking that sensations exist? (2) how do we go
about characterizing sensations? and (3) what role
do sensations play in perception? But before we
attempt to decipher Bergmann's claims about
sensations, it will be helpful to reflect for a moment
on the general framework into which sensations
must fit, and specifically, to ask whether the analyses we have given of perceiving and appearing place
limitations on the possible meanings that can be
given to the concept of sensations.
In the first place, the realistic assumption of our
analysis of perceiving, which rests on a fundamental
dichotomy between the subject's act and its actual
physical object, places definite restrictions on what
we can say about sensations. Specifically, within
this realist framework, we can assume that sensations, or sense objects,ll are not identical with, or
constituents of, the ordinary objects of perceptual
acts, such as tables and trees. If sense objects do
play a role in veridical perception, then it is clear
that they must be "located" in the subject's mental

s The account of appearing that I have developed is based on the account given by Wilfrid Sellars in "Empiricism and the
Philosophy of Mind" in Science, Perception and Reality (New York, 1g63), sec. 111, pp. 140--149,and differs only in minor respects
from it.
lo Sentences such as (4) above, "This wall appears green to me, and of course it is green," sound odd because one who uses the
sentence is granting in the second clause what the first clause suggests he refuses to grant. Cf. "Mary will probably arrive tonight, and in fact Mary will arrive tonight."
11 I am here anticipating Bergmann in speaking of sense objects (Bergmann uses the term "sense data"). For the moment, we
may think of them as the entities that are sensed in a sensation.
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experience as an experience. And to be sure, Bergmann holds that sense objects are mental entities in
the sense that they are mind-dependent (exist only
so long as the subject is having them) and private
(can only be directly known by the subject who has
them).
Moreover,whenwe consider how sensationsmight
figure in nonveridical perception, we arrive at parallel
conclusions. For we interpreted mere appeari n g ~as mental acts intending perceptual states of
affairs: when there appears to be a green spot before me, then my (false) perceptual judgment
("this is a green spot ") is intentionally related to a
nonactual state of affairs (this being a green spot).
And there does not seem to be any justification for
identifying the perceptual fact of something's being
a green spot with an object of sensation. At least
Bergmann does not make any such identification.
How exactly do sensations function in the perceptual experience? This is a question on which
our analyses of appearing and perceiving have so
far shed very little light. We saw that appearsstatements do describe one's experience, but only
indirectly, by assimilating it to the experience
involved in a corresponding perceiving. And although we did distinguish the propositional and
nonpropositional components of the perceptual
experience, we have not yet found any way of
directly characterizing the nonpropositional component except to say, with Bergmann, that perceptual acts exhibit the property being a perceiving.
But while saying this does mark the difference between perceptual and nonperceptual acts such as
thinking and believing, it does not show us any way
of characterizing the spec@ features of the nonpropositional component of perceptual experience. I shall
argue below that we can describe these specific
features by coming to a proper understanding of
sensations and their properties.
We turn now to Bergmann's account of sensations as he presents it in the two essays, "Acts" and
"Realistic Postscript." Bergmann bases his argument for sensations on certain facts of introspection; he holds that sensations can be discovered in
one's mental state (or as he says, "conscious state")
by performing a mental shift. What one notices
while in this special mental set are certain colorful
entities or "sense data" existing momentarily in
one's conscious state. However, the role that these
sense data play in perception is obscure in Bergmann's theory. The crucial claim is that sense data
do not figure in the analysis of perceivings: perceiving~can be fully explicated in terms of mental

acts and their intentional objects. Because of this,
Bergmann concludes that "dialectically it makes no
difference whatsoever whether or not there are
sense data" (RP, 325, italics omitted).
In presenting his idea of sense data, Bergmann
uses his earlier distinction between perceiving I
and 2. To refresh the reader's memory, we said that
a perceiving, intends a whole physical object while
a perceiving, intends only the constituent particulars which can be more narrowlv focused on-in
the case of vision, the area-particulars "in" the
facing surface. In addition, Bergrnann makes a key
use of the notion of externality, which he takes to be a
characteristic of all perceived, and perceived,
objects, but not of sensed objects. Here are the
relevant passages :
Everyone can make the shift from perceiving, to perceiving,. . . .The molecular fact intended by a perceiving, (of mine) still presents the "idea of external
existence.". Whatever else may or may not be
"in" [my conscious state], the molecular fact, its
intention [MA, certainly is not. (RP, 325.)

..

He continues :
To claim that there are sense data is to claim that, just
as we can shift from perceiving, to perceiving,, we can
make a second shift, in the same direction, as it were,
which
from perceiving,. . . . If the intention from-you
shifted is Mp, call this conscious state Mj. Mp is
exactly like Mp. Only the [externality] has disappeared! This conscious state @ is a sense datum.
(RP' 325.)

The most plausible interpretation of the second
shift Bergmann describes, from perceiving, to
sensing, is that it is a shift from seeing something
which is not in one's conscious state to seeing (or
sensing) something which is in one's conscious
state. This is why Bergmann stresses the fact that
the object of the perceiving, is not in one's conscious state. Further, even though the objects of the
perceiving, and the sensing are "exactly like" one
another, Bergmann distinguishes them on the
grounds that the perceived object, but not the
sensed object, "presents the idea of external
existence." How does this notion of the presence or
absence of externality shed light on sensations?
While Bergmann takes the "idea of external
existence" as presented by an object to be a simple
datum of consciousness (RP, 3") it is natural to
interpret this notion in terms of the idea that the
object that one sees (or seems to see) is in physical
space. If this is correct, then in claiming that the
objects of sensation do not present the idea of
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externality, Bergmann would be saying, plausibly,
that when one shifts from a perceiving to a sensing
the sensed object is no longer spatially separated
from the subject in the way that the perceived object
was: the sensed object is not (or does not appear to
be) in physical space.
Now it is difficult to deny the introspective facts
to which Bergmann is calling attention, namely
that we can come to notice the visual objects he
describes by changing our mental set. Moreover, it
seems correct to say that these objects are not seen
as being in physical space, viz., they are not in the
vicinity of or near the surface of the objects we were
looking at before shifting into our phenomenological frame of mind. Hence I conclude that Bergmann has given us some reason for thinking that
sense data exist. Furthermore, it would seem to be a
justifiable inference that sense data are present in
all perceptions, since whenever we are perceiving
we are capable of noticing them by shifting into the
proper mental set.12 But still, it is not at all clear
what role, if any, sense data play in perception, and
how they are connected with perceptual acts.
Specifically, we may wonder whether it is any
longer necessary to say that perceptual acts have
the simple property perceiving, once it is recognized
that sense data always accompany these acts in
one's conscious state.

My objections to Bergmann's conception of sense
data are two. First, it obscures the role of sensations
in perception and ultimately leads to the idea that
they are irrelevant to a philosophical understanding of ordinary perceiving, as happens with
Bergmann. Secondly, it loses sight of an essential
feature of the perceptual experience as an experience, namely that it has the same kind of sensory
properties that Bergmann ascribes to sense data.
What I am suggesting is that it is the perceptual
experience as a whole which may be said to have
sensory properties (as well as a propositional
character).
However, this claim must be qualified in an
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important respect. We must take into account
something which Bergmann overlooks, namely
that mental entities, of whatever sort, are not things
that can have sensory properties. A sense datum,
for example, cannot be literally green and triangular since these properties pertain primarily to
physical objects in space. Hence what must be said
about inner experiences is that they have properties
(let us call them phenomenal properties) which are
different from, but analogous to, physical sensory
properties such as color and shape.13 I t is these
phenomenal properties which, I am arguing, may
be ascribed to the perceptual experience. If I am
right about this, then a correct description of the
experience that occurs in the perception of a green
triangle is that it has, first, the propositional
character " this-is-a-green-triangle" (cum attitude),
and second, unique sensory properties analogous
to greenness and triangularity.
But there is no reason why we should not refer to
the sensory or nonpropositional component of the
perceptual experience as the subject's sensation.
That is, we seem to have found a useful and commonsensical concept of a sensation as a component
part of the perceptual experience. Indeed, once this
suggestion is taken seriously, then it dawns on us
that the introspective evidence pertaining to sense
data that Bergrnann brings forth does not justify
his inference that sense data and perceptual act are
distinct entities. For all Bergmann has shown, it is
quite possible that when one makes the shift from a
perceiving to a sensing, he is coming to notice
properties of his perceptual act.
I shall try to defend my nonBergmannian concept
of a sensation, and specifically the idea that it has
the phenomenal features I described, by drawing
on one of our conclusions about appearings. I
argued earlier that in making appears-reports, one
is comparing his experience with that of a corresponding seeing. Moreover, I suggested that the
subject is able to recognize the respects in which his
experience resembles and differs from that related
experience. If this was correct, then the report that
there appears to be a green triangular object over
there involves the claim that

'1 What should be said about Bergmann's perceiving, ? Has he succeeded in describing an intermediate stage between perceiving whole objects (or rather the facing surfaces of whole objects) and coming to sense sense data-a stage in which one
sees an expanse or area as being in external physical space? Perhaps it is necessary to pass through such a stage in coming to
notice our inner experiences; but I would argue that whether it is is a phenomenological question which, to use a Bergmannian
turn ofphrase, is dialectically irrelevant to the question of sense data and their characteristics.
as Wilfrid Sellan describes the analogy between physical and phenomenal color and shape in terms of common logical and
structural features in "The Structure of Knowledge: ( I ) Perception" (unpublished),p. 20. I would add that these physical and
phenomenal properties are disanalogous as regards their causal features.
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this perceptual experience (of mine) as an experience resembles the experience involved in actually seeing a green triangular object over there
in respect of its greenness and triangularity.
Now in reporting comparatively about the
greenness and triangularity of one's experience, I
think it is clear that one is not simply referring to
the propositional element of the two experiences
(which does include the concepts green and triangular). One is also characterizing one's experience in its nonpropositional aspect by means of the
predicates "green" and "triangular." In this way,
I believe, our analysis of appearings lends support
to our concept of sensations as that part of the perceptual experience having properties which are
counterparts of the perceptible properties of their
intended objects.14
Once we have put this concept of sensations to
use in understanding perceivings, then there is no
longer any motivation for saying, with Bergmann,
that the perceptual character of perceivings is a
simple mental property, for we have succeeded in
giving a more determinate description of this
property in terms of sensations. Moreover, if as I
have claimed, sensations are component parts of
perceivings, then they are as dialectically relevant
in giving an analysis of perceiving as is the act
itself.
Finally, it is important to realize that my defense
of sensations has not rested on the claim that they
are ever observed, i.e., that they are ever perceptual
objects. All I have said is that one can recognize
certain things about his mental experience, which
is simply to say that one can give noninferential
reports about his experience. And while I certainly do not deny the relevance of the introspective facts that Bergmann calls attention to, I
believe I have shown that Bergmann is wrong in
claiming that these facts are the sole grounds for
introducing sensations, for I have found other
common sense considerations which lead to this
idea.

To conclude this discussion, I shall review briefly
some of the more important elements of Bergmann's perceptual theory, as well as where I have
found them to be in need of revision. ( I ) On the
important matter of nonveridical perception, Bergmann has made a strong case for saying that the
intentional objects involved in these perceptions
exist in some sense, though they are not actual.
These nonactual states of affairs, he pointed out,
may be perceptually indistinguishable from actual
states of affairs. Although Bergmann's concept of
these nonactual states of affairs is not a wholly
satisfactory one, he has at least shown us the place
they occupy in perception, and hence the road that
any rival theory must travel.
( 2 ) Bergmann rightly drew attention to the perceptual character of perceptual acts, which distinguishes them from such nonperceptions as merely
thinking or believing. However, we found that it
was not necessary to stop with the idea that being a
perceiving is a simple mental property of acts, but
that it could be further explicated in terms of a
concept of sensations.
(3) In regard to appearing, although Bergmann
correctly assimilated the concept of appearing to
that of veridical perceiving, we found it necessary
to strengthen this assimilation in such a way that
appearings must be analyzed in terms of veridical
perceivings (in the sense of knowings)
(4) Concerning sensations, Bergmann has stressed
the introspective grounds which justify, in part,
philosophical claims about sensations, thus helping to secure their place in the philosophy of mind.
We supplemented his thesis by constructing a different, but commonsensical, notion of sensations
which did not rely on introspective evidence, and
which made sensations an integral part of the perceptual process.
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14 I should make it clear that I am not claiming that the concept of sensations that I have given is the only acceptable one,
philosophically speaking, nor that it is the most penetrating one. Specifically,I do not wish to deny that there are good grounds
for speaking of sensations as entities (or states) separate from the perceptual experience. In fact, I believe that there are convincing
reasons for inferring the existence of antecedent sensory states which mediate between the purely physical state and the "fullblown" perceptual experience. (See Wilfrid Sellars, Science and Metaphysics [New York, I 9681,ch. I , for a valuable discussion of
what Sellars calls the "sense impressioninference.") One such reason is to give an adequate explanation of the sensory component
of perception that I have described. But the fact that such theoretical advances are necessary should not blind us to the more
rudimentary understanding of sensations as the nonpropositional component of perceivings.

